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- THE GULF WAR, Page 20The Night That Bush Decided
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- George Bush, as is his habit at times of crisis, escaped the
- White House on Thursday for a bit of what he calls "prudent
- recreating" -- an evening at Ford's Theater to see Black
- Eagles, a play about black airmen in World War II. Says one of
- his top advisers: "I think it helped clear his mind" for what
- he knew would be one of the most fateful decisions of his
- presidency.
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- Shortly before Bush departed for the show, he had spoken
- with Mikhail Gorbachev, who reported that he and Iraqi Foreign
- Minister Tariq Aziz had agreed on terms for Iraq to withdraw
- from Kuwait, terms that would allow Saddam Hussein to preserve
- much of his military machine and political prestige.
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- Bush quickly convened nine top aides, and while he watched
- his play, they plotted a countermove. "It was a very delicate
- business," said a senior official. "We wanted to maintain as
- good a relationship as possible with the Soviets, but at the
- same time, we were determined not to back down -- to make
- Saddam either surrender to us or face military defeat."
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- At 10:20 p.m., when Bush returned to his private study on
- the second floor of the White House residence, his war cabinet
- was waiting. It was a warm evening for February; the fireplace
- was dark. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell was clad
- in a green turtleneck and sports jacket. Vice President Dan
- Quayle and Defense Secretary Dick Cheney wore tuxedoes, having
- come from a dinner for visiting Queen Margrethe II of Denmark.
- Cheney had removed his eyeglasses and was absentmindedly
- chewing one end of the frames. Like everyone else, he was
- studying a pair of freshly copied documents in his lap.
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- One was a list of "criteria" by which the allies would judge
- whether an Iraqi withdrawal was unconditional and worthy of an
- allied cease-fire. The second was a single-page argument about
- why the Gorbachev-Aziz agreement was "unacceptable."
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- Bush scanned the drafts, nodded and said, "I like both of
- these. Let's put them together. It's not enough to just say we
- don't accept the Soviet plan. I went through this with
- Gorbachev on the phone, and he knows it's unacceptable and he
- knows the specific reasons why, and we ought to lay them out
- to the whole world."
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- "Well, let's set a date and set a time," suggested Powell.
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- "I think that's a good idea," Bush replied immediately.
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- Powell explained that a deadline would be "helpful to the
- military because then my guys in the field know what to expect.
- They know exactly what to be looking for and when." National
- Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft agreed.
-
- The discussion then turned to the question of "Do we make
- the date tomorrow night or Sunday or Monday or when?" Bush
- wanted it as soon as possible. So did Powell. Secretary of
- State James Baker cautioned that the U.S. ultimatum must have
- allied support and must be seen to allow a reasonable time for
- Iraqi acceptance. "The diplomatic question was the toughest,"
- said a participant. "We had 28 partners, and the biggest
- concern was making sure we could get everybody on board."
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- Someone suggested that noon Saturday be the deadline. Bush:
- "I think that's a good idea. What's it do for you, Colin?"
- Powell: "It's good for me." Noon in Washington was sundown in
- Kuwait, where allied forces hold the advantage in
- night-fighting ability. Bush then asked, "What's it do for you,
- Jim?" Baker: "It's good for me too, but it is a new item that
- the allies don't know about and we need to get back to them
- about."
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- At that point, about 11:15 p.m., Bush said, "O.K., we're
- agreed then. It's noon Saturday."
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- The meeting broke about midnight. Baker went back to his
- office to phone the allied foreign ministers, and Bush went off
- to bed, confident that whatever course Saddam chose, he would
- be acting on a timetable and conditions set not by himself or
- the Soviet Union but by the U.S. and its allies.
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